Our partisan differences are about identity, not policy
For months, the two presidential candidates have been neck-and-neck in the polls. The differences in the electorate go beyond polarization over Donald Trump, though, because polls for congressional candidates show a similar phenomenon. Both houses of Congress will likely be nearly evenly divided after this election.
If there has been one constant in this tumultuous campaign, it is that there are very few persuadable swing voters. Americans are evenly polarized along partisan lines, with neither party able to close the deal and win a decisive victory. What accounts for this level of polarization? Why are we so divided as a country and so entrenched in our partisan preferences?
We’re not divided by policy choices. On most of the issues, the two parties are not moving further apart. On border security and the economy—the issues of greatest concern to most Republicans—the Democrats have moved closer to the Republican position in recent months. Kamala Harris has vowed to fight inflation, and her economic plan prominently features tax cuts for the middle class. The Democratic party platform this year promises to “secure the border and fix the broken immigration system.”
Likewise, on one of the issues that Democrats are most concerned about—abortion—the Republican Party has moved closer to the Democratic position and has abandoned its official opposition to same-sex marriage.
Of course, there are differences in nuance between these positions. Democrats and Republicans don’t believe exactly the same things about the economy, border security, immigration, and abortion. Nevertheless, the policy differences alone are too small to account for the deep antipathy between the opposing parties. In fact, I would argue that the official policy differences between the parties were higher in the mid-1980s (when there were large numbers of swing voters and ticket-splitters) than they are today.
Indeed, when it comes to taxing the wealthy—traditionally one of the starkest divides between the two parties—the two candidates differ hardly at all. Trump left office with a top marginal tax rate of thirty-seven percent for individuals earning over $400,000. Harris has proposed raising that to 39.6 percent, while lowering taxes for the middle class. I doubt that a disagreement over this 2.6% difference is what’s fueling all the partisan anger in this country. Nor are the Trump tariffs a real point of contention, since both Republicans and Democrats disagree among themselves about this issue.
No, the things that divide the parties are not policy issues, but rather identity politics and different national visions. That can be seen in the two parties’ platforms.
In keeping with what has become standard protocol at many academic meetings in American universities, the Democratic Party platform begins with a list of Native American nations to whom the land on which the convention hall was located once belonged.
The Republican Party platform, by contrast, opens with a quick partisan history lesson about the decline of American greatness phrased not in the language of the universities but in the popular mythology of the culturally conservative working class. “Our Nation’s History is filled with the stories of brave men and women who gave everything they had to build America into the Greatest Nation in the History of the World,” the platform declares. But then “politicians” allowed “our Borders to be overrun, our cities to be overtaken by crime, our System of Justice to be weaponized, and our young people to develop a sense of hopelessness and despair. They rejected our History and our Values. Quite simply, they did everything in their power to destroy our Country.” Donald Trump then emerged as “an unapologetic Champion of the American People. He reignited the American Spirit and called on us to renew our National Pride.” (All capitalization is in the original.)
The difference between these two platforms is not a matter of policy but a matter of identity and beliefs. The Democratic Party believes in established institutions; the Republican Party believes that institutions have been corrupted and that a Great Man (no doubt this would be capitalized) is needed to singlehandedly rescue the country from despair.
The Democratic Party now appeals to people who identify with established institutions and who value their preservation. The Republican Party now appeals to people who identify as anti-establishment and who believe in the myth of a heroic individual who can destroy the corrupt institutions that are opposed to American greatness. That’s the reason for the division between the rural and urban vote or between the college-educated and those lacking college degrees.
And because this is a matter more of identity than thoughtful policy differences, people often proudly proclaim their partisan loyalty in the same way they would loyalty to a sports team or affirmation of a religious creed. In the case of Republican voters, a large Trump flag or a MAGA hat—the type of apparel or décor often chosen to celebrate a favorite sports team—might signal loyalty to Team Trump. In the case of Democratic voters, a yard sign listing one’s credo—“In this house we believe Black lives matter, women’s rights are human rights, no human is illegal, science is real . . .”—might substitute for a religious affirmation.
Once party politics becomes a matter of identity, partisan news sources can easily reinforce this tribal mindset by providing a partisan slant on every new development that might otherwise prompt a more objective observer to question their favorite party’s policy positions. This happened during the Gilded Age of the late nineteenth century, when openly partisan newspapers vied with each other to hurl the most scurrilous charges at the opposing side. For much of the twentieth century, mainstream news media aspired to a greater degree of objectivity, but now the era of partisan news media has returned—and with it, a heightened degree of polarization based on political tribal identity.
What’s at stake in this election, therefore, is not a set of policy outcomes but rather an opposing set of political identities. Regardless of which presidential candidate is elected, abortion access is almost certain to expand. Regardless of which candidate wins, the federal budget deficit will increase. Regardless of whether the Democrats or Republicans control the government, tighter border security policies will be implemented but undocumented immigration will continue.
What does hinge on the outcome of the election is whether the party in power will favor established institutions or seek to destroy them, both internationally (as with NATO) or at home (as with higher education).
Because the divisions in self-identity between the pro-establishment and anti-establishment parties are so vast, I don’t think that the election of either candidate will end our polarization. If Harris wins, I expect that the Republican Party’s reactionary working-class constituency will continue to expand, just as it has during Joe Biden’s presidency. If Trump is elected, I imagine that the anger among pro-establishment constituencies on university campuses and elsewhere will continue to build, just as it did during Trump’s previous presidency.
The Democrats will continue their transformation into a suburban, middle-class, educated, pro-establishment party, while the Republicans will shed some of the suburbanites but continue to attract larger numbers of Hispanics and working-class people of color who feel alienated from established institutions.
So, the tribal polarization between Democrats and Republicans will continue. Unfortunately, no election can heal that rift—which means that after all the votes are cast, we’ll wake up on November 6 just as polarized as we were before.
Daniel K. Williams is a historian working at Ashland University and the author of Defenders of the Unborn: The Pro-Life Movement before Roe v. Wade and The Politics of the Cross: A Christian Alternative to Partisanship. He is a Contributing Editor at Current.